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I. Introduction 
Suppose that the United States Supreme Court were to hold that same-
sex marriage is protected by the Federal Constitution. What implications 
might such a ruling have for marriage or family law more generally? 
Answering such a question is difficult, at least in part, because an important 
component of such an analysis would focus on the specific reasoning of the 
Court, and there are clear dangers in making predictions about possible 
changes in family law based on an opinion that has not yet been written.  
Discussing the implications of the Court’s imagined ruling is daunting 
for yet another reason. The Court’s recent opinions analyzing the 
constitutionality of laws targeting on the basis of sexual orientation do not 
provide clear guidance with respect to the reach of the protections actually 
recognized, which makes discussing the likely reach of an imagined 
opinion even more dangerous. Nonetheless, this article will not only assume 
that the Court will find same-sex marriage protected by the Federal 
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Constitution, but will also make some assumptions about what the opinion 
will (and will not) say and do.  
Part II of this article focuses on two of the Court’s recent decisions 
involving laws targeting on the basis of orientation, and then makes some 
predictions regarding how the Court might craft a decision holding that 
state same-sex marriage bans violate constitutional guarantees. This part 
then discusses how some states might try to treat same-sex marital couples 
differently from other couples with respect to the rights and benefits to 
which they are entitled under state law, and whether such attempts would 
likely pass constitutional muster. Part III focuses on a different way that 
states might react to the Court’s finding that the Federal Constitution 
protects the right to marry a same-sex partner—they might emphasize (or 
perhaps deemphasize) marital status when determining individuals’ rights 
and responsibilities, e.g., by modifying their approaches to the rights and 
obligations of cohabitating couples. The article concludes that a holding 
that the right to marry a same-sex partner is constitutionally protected is 
unlikely to cause significant changes in family law, although states reacting 
to such a decision are more likely to diverge than converge with respect to 
the degree to which they distinguish between marital and non-marital 
couples. 
II. Family, Orientation, and the Constitution 
Two recent Supreme Court cases—Lawrence v. Texas
1
 and Windsor v. 
United States
2
—are helpful to examine when seeking to determine what a 
decision striking down same-sex marriage bans might look like. While the 
Court in both cases struck down laws disadvantaging same-sex couples, the 
analyses offered neither specified the level of scrutiny employed nor 
whether the rights at issue were fundamental rather than mere liberty 
interests. That failure to specify has led to some confusion about the reach 
of the protections recognized by the Court, a result that is likely to be 
repeated if the Court remains silent about the level of scrutiny employed or 
the nature of the liberty interest protected in the envisioned decision 
regarding same-sex marriage.  
                                                                                                     
 1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 2. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
MARRIAGE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE FUTURE 305 
A. Lawrence 
Lawrence involved a challenge to “a Texas statute making it a crime 
for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual 
conduct.”
3
 The Court made clear that the “petitioners were adults . . . . [and 
that] [t]heir conduct was in private and consensual.”
4
  The question 
presented was whether “the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the 
private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”
5
 
In analyzing whether substantive due process protects the right of 
adults of the same sex to engage in intimate relations, the Lawrence Court 
discussed
6





 Roe v. Wade,
9
 Carey v. Populations Services 
International,
10
 Bowers v. Hardwick,
11
 and Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.
12
  The Court’s inclusion of these cases 
in the context of assessing whether Texas’s same-sex sodomy ban passed 
constitutional muster sent mixed messages. On the one hand, by discussing 
cases involving interests such as contraception and abortion that are 
protected by the right to privacy,
13
 the Court implied that adult, consensual 
intimacy was also protected by the right to privacy. Indeed, after discussing 
these cases involving contraception and abortion rights, the Court explained 
that Bowers, in which the Court had upheld a Georgia law criminalizing 
sodomy,
14
 “was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct 
today,”
15
 which presumably means that the privacy jurisprudence existing 
                                                                                                     
 3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 4. Id. at 564. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. at 564–78  
 7. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 8. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 10. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 11. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 12. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 13. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (noting that the Due 
Process Clause protects the rights to marry, to have children, and to contraception and 
abortion). 
 14. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (“We do not agree . . . that the sodomy laws of some 
twenty-five States should be invalidated.”). 
 15. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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at the time Bowers was decided required a different result.
16
 Yet, even after 
overruling Bowers,
17
 the Court neither stated that adult consensual intimacy 
was a fundamental interest nor that strict scrutiny was being employed to 
strike down the Texas statute.
18
  But if adult consensual intimacy is a mere 
liberty interest, then a state can prohibit such intimacy as long as the state’s 
doing so is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
19
  Whether or not 
Texas had a legitimate interest in prohibiting same-sex intimacy,
20
 the 
rational basis test hardly sets a high bar to overcome insofar as states wish 
to impose other burdens on members of the LGBT community.
21
  
Lawrence sent a mixed message in yet another respect. On the one 
hand, the Lawrence Court chided the Bowers Court for having 
misapprehended the nature of the injury imposed by a statute criminalizing 
same-sex sodomy.  “To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to 
engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put 
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said 
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”
22
  The Court 
explained that sodomy prohibitions “seek to control a personal relationship 
that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the 
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”
23
 Here, 
while refusing to comment about whether same-sex relationships must be 
formally recognized, the Court implies that such relationships have worth.
24
 
                                                                                                     
 16. The Court also suggested that cases decided subsequent to Bowers further 
undermined that holding. See id. at 573 (“Two principal cases decided after Bowers cast its 
holding into even more doubt.”). 
 17. See id, at 578 (“Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”). 
 18. See id, at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[N]owhere does the Court's opinion declare 
that homosexual sodomy is a ‘fundamental right’ under the Due Process Clause; nor does it 
subject the Texas law to the standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if 
homosexual sodomy were a ‘fundamental right.’”). 
 19. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (“[O]ur decisions lead 
us to conclude that the asserted ‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide is not a 
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The Constitution also 
requires, however, that Washington's assisted-suicide ban be rationally related to legitimate 
government interests.”) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993)). 
 20. Justice Scalia believed that the Texas law was rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 21. Cf. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 816–
17 (11th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that the burden imposed by Lawrence is rather easy to 
overcome).  
 22. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex Relationships: On Values, 
Valuing, and the Constitution, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 285, 293 (2006) (“By suggesting 
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So, too, when explaining why sodomy laws were unconstitutional, the 
Court explained that “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a 
personal bond that is more enduring.”
25
  But the fact that sexual conduct 
may be part of relationship that is more enduring would hardly be a reason 
militating in favor of striking down the prohibition unless the more 
enduring relationship were itself of worth.
26
  That said, however, the Court 
not only expressly declined to address whether same-sex marriage was 
constitutionally protected,
27
 but the Court also failed to include the right-to-
marry cases when discussing the right to privacy.
28
  It was simply unclear 
whether the Court was directing attention away from same-sex marriage 
because it had not yet decided whether same-sex marriage was protected by 
the Federal Constitution or whether, instead, it had already decided but 
simply did not wish to bring attention to its having already done so.
29
  
The Lawrence Court also mentioned Romer v. Evans,
30
 in which “the 
Court struck down class-based legislation directed at homosexuals as a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”
31
 While suggesting that a 
challenge to the Texas statute on equal protection grounds was “tenable,”
32
 
the Lawrence Court feared that its striking down the law on that basis 
would lead some to believe that “a prohibition would be valid if drawn 
differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and 
different-sex participants.”
33
  The Court reasoned that “[e]quality of 
                                                                                                     
that this enduring personal bond provides one of the reasons that the same-sex relations are 
protected, the Court is attributing positive constitutional weight to same-sex relationships.”). 
 25. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 26. See J. Richard Broughton, The Criminalization of Consensual Adult Sex after 
Lawrence, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 125, 158 (2014) (discussing “the 
language in Lawrence . . . that the right is (or might be) predicated upon the existence of an 
intimate relationship or upon conduct designed to promote emotional intimacy between 
people”). 
 27. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve . . . whether 
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons 
seek to enter.”).  
 28. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 
(1978); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 29. Cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This case ‘does not 
involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and 
logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court.”). 
 30. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 31. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558, 574. 
 32. .Id. 
 33. Id. at 575. 
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treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected 
by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and 
a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”
34
  Thus, by striking 
down the Texas prohibition on due process grounds, the Court was both 
affirming the value of same-sex relationships and the dignity of members of 
the class, whose relationships could not be demeaned.
35
  
Traditionally, relationships have been accorded more constitutional 
weight than sexual relations, so a finding that same-sex adult consensual 
relations are protected suggests that same-sex relationships may also be 
protected.
36
  That conclusion was given further support by Windsor v. 
United States,
37
 in which the Court addressed whether the federal 





In Windsor, the Supreme Court held that section 3 of the Defense of 
Marriage Act was unconstitutional.
39
 When holding that the section violated 
Fifth Amendment guarantees,
40
 the Court did not make clear whether the 
                                                                                                     
 34. Id. 
 35. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (DOMA “tells those 
couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal 
recognition.  This places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a second-tier 
marriage.  The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the 
Constitution protects.”) (citing  539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
 36. See Mark Strasser, State Marriage Amendments and Overreaching: On Plain 
Meaning, Good Public Policy, and Constitutional Limitations, 25 LAW & INEQ. 59, 110 
(2007) (“By analogizing same-sex relationships to marital relationships and holding that 
adult, consensual, same-sex relations are constitutionally protected . . . the Lawrence Court 
implies that same-sex relationships have constitutional protection.”). 
 37. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 38. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2695 (2013) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.”).  
 39. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (“DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the 
liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.”). 
 40. See id. (“And though Congress has great authority to design laws to fit its own 
conception of sound national policy, it cannot deny the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). 
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law offended substantive due process, equal protection, or both kinds of 
guarantees. Clarification of the basis upon which Windsor was decided 
might have important implications for any opinion striking down state 
same-sex marriage bans.
41
   
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not 
contain an equal protection clause
42
 but, instead, incorporates those 
guarantees within the due process component of that amendment.
43
 But that 
means that DOMA’s incompatibility with due process guarantees does not 
establish whether the statute failed to pass muster as a matter of substantive 




Sometimes, the Windsor Court seemed to be discussing due process 
and sometimes equal protection. Thus, part of the opinion focused on the 
nature of the implicated liberty interest at issue.
45
 But the Court also noted 
that the federal provision’s “principal effect [wa]s to identify a subset of 
state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal.”
46
 By suggesting that 
“the principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to demean 
those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage,”
47
 the Court 
suggested that equal protection guarantees had been violated.  
The envisioned opinion striking down state same-sex marriage bans 
might focus on some of the language in Windsor discussing the nature of 
the interest at issue and emphasize the Windsor point that “marriage is more 
                                                                                                     
 41. Indeed, were Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation of Windsor correct, that 
opinion would seem to provide little if any basis upon which courts could strike down state 
same-sex marriage.  See id. at 2696  (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court does not have 
before it, and the logic of its opinion does not decide, the distinct question whether the 
States, in the exercise of their ‘historic and essential authority to define the marital relation,’ 
may continue to utilize the traditional definition of marriage.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 42. U.S. CONST., amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”). 
 43. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (2013) (“The liberty protected by the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any 
person the equal protection of the laws.”) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S., 497, 499–500 
(1954); Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Penã, 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995)).  
 44. Cf. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The sum of all the Court's 
nonspecific hand-waving is that this law is invalid (maybe on equal-protection grounds, 
maybe on substantive-due-process grounds, and perhaps with some amorphous federalism 
component playing a role).”). 
 45. See id. at 2695 (“DOMA divests married same-sex couples of the duties and 
responsibilities that are an essential part of married life and that they in most cases would be 
honored to accept were DOMA not in force.”).  
 46. Id. at 2694. 
 47. Id. at 2695. 
310 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 303 (2015) 
than a routine classification for purposes of certain statutory benefits,”
48
 
thereby emphasizing the unique nature of the interest at issue. Perhaps the 
Court will simply state that “the decision to marry is a fundamental right”
49
 
and then will explain that same-sex couples cannot be precluded from 
exercising that right.
50
 If the Court were to adopt that approach, there might 
be a number of implications, depending upon what the right to marry 
includes.  
Suppose, for example, that a state were to recognize same-sex 
marriage but were to accord fewer benefits and obligations to marriages 
involving same-sex couples than it did to marriages involving different-sex 
couples. Just as some states tried to accord a special status to different-sex 
marriage by creating a separate civil union status for same-sex couples that 
involved the same rights and obligations of marriage but was nonetheless 
called something else,
51
 states might try to accord a special status to 
different-sex marriage by recognizing same-sex marriage but according 
fewer rights and obligations to that status. 
The Windsor Court discussed the “States' interest in defining and 
regulating the marital relation, subject to constitutional guarantees.”
52
 Here, 
the court seemed to recognize that “the incidents, benefits, and obligations 
of marriage . . . may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one 
State to the next.”
53
 A state might claim that as long as it recognizes the 
right of same-sex couples to marry, it has no constitutional obligation to 
treat those marriages in exactly the same way as it treats other marriages. 
After all, it might be argued, some states have two kinds of marriages—
marriages and “covenant marriages”
54
—so states deciding to create more 
than one kind of marriage should not pose any constitutional difficulties.  
                                                                                                     
 48. Id. at 2692. 
 49. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987). 
 50. Cf. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992–993 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(stating that when same-sex “plaintiffs seek to exercise the fundamental right to marry under 
the Due Process Clause” they are exercising a fundamental right that has always existed). 
 51. See, e.g., 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1204 (a) (2010) (“Parties to a civil union shall have 
all the same benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from 
statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil law, as 
are granted to spouses in a civil marriage.”). 
 52. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Allison Gerli, Comment, Living Happily Ever After in a Land of Separate 
Church and State: Treatment of Islamic Marital Contracts, 26 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 
113, 114 (2013) (“In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Louisiana, Arkansas, and 
Arizona enacted covenant marriage statutes encouraging long-term marriage as counter-
measures to the enactment of no-fault divorce statutes.”). 
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When discussing “the long-established precept that the incidents, 
benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married couples 
within each State,”
55
 the Windsor Court likely did not have in mind the 
difference between covenant marriages and other marriages and presumably 
would have no objection to states creating more than one kind of marriage 
as long as all those eligible to marry were permitted to choose which kind 
of marriage they wished to celebrate. However, just as section 3 of DOMA 
was unconstitutional because it “identif[ied] a subset of state-sanctioned 
marriages and ma[d]e them unequal,”
56
 a state attempting to create a 
separate subset of marriages (with fewer rights and responsibilities) solely 
comprised of same-sex couples would also likely be found constitutionally 
deficient.  Thus, the Windsor Court implies that were a state to distinguish 
among the benefits afforded to married couples by refusing to afford to 
same-sex couples the same options that different-sex couples had, the Court 
would examine that differentiation “with skepticism, if not 
a jaundiced eye.”
57
   
What of civil unions? Both because the Windsor Court expressly 
refused to characterize marriage simply as “a routine classification for 
purposes of certain statutory benefits”
58
 and because the Windsor Court 
confined its “opinion and its holding . . . to . . . lawful marriages,”
59
 it seems 
likely that the Court would not find that the relevant constitutional 
guarantees had been met were a state to afford same-sex couples the option 
of entering into civil unions but not of celebrating marriages. Such a 
compromise would “undermine[] both the public and private significance of 
state-sanctioned same-sex . . . [unions].”
60
 But the state does not do 
constitutional harm when it affords the option of entering into a civil union 
to all couples eligible to marry. Thus, Windsor should not be understood to 
preclude the states from recognizing civil union status but merely to 
preclude the states from reserving civil union status for same-sex couples 
and marriage for different-sex couples. 
While Windsor suggests that marriage is a special status that dignifies 
relationships and thus involves an important liberty interest,
61
 the opinion 
                                                                                                     
 55. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. 
 56. Id. at 2694. 
 57. Swint v. Chambers Cnty.  Com'n, 514 U.S. 35, 43 (1995) (citing Digital Equip. 
Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873 (1994)). 
 58. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 . 
 59. Id. at 2696. 
 60. Id. at 2694. 
 61. Id. 
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also had a strong equal protection component. For example, the Court 
explained that “the principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law 
[section 3 of DOMA] are to demean those persons who are in a lawful 
same-sex marriage,”
62
 and expressly noted that the “liberty protected by the 
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition 
against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.”
63
 The 
Court’s suggestion that the DOMA section offended equal protection 
guarantees was important, at least in part, because equal protection 
guarantees also constrain the states. Indeed, the Court’s suggestion that “the 
equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth 
Amendment right all the more specific and all the better understood and 
preserved”
64
 was important for a few reasons. First, lest there be any doubt, 
it suggests that equal protection was one of the bases upon which the 
federal statute was struck down, even if not the only basis. Second, it seems 
to be offering a warning to the states. Because the Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection guarantees apply to the states,
65
 the Court seems to be 
providing notice that state marriage amendments are also constitutionally 
vulnerable.
66
 It would be unsurprising for any opinion striking down state 
same-sex marriage bans to quote Windsor’s comment about the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection guarantees. 
One confusing element of Windsor is that it never articulates the 
standard of review being used to strike down the statute at issue.
67
 Perhaps 
the Court is subjecting the statute to intermediate scrutiny, although it might 
instead be using a less deferential form of rational basis review.
68
 
                                                                                                     
 62. Id. at 2695.  
 63. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S., 497, 499–500 
(1954); Adarand Constr. Inc. v. Penã, 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995)). 
 64. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. 
 65. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 66. Cf. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“My guess is that the 
majority . . . needs some rhetorical basis to support its pretense that today's prohibition of 
laws excluding same-sex marriage is confined to the Federal Government (leaving the 
second, state-law shoe to be dropped later, maybe next Term).”). 
 67. Id. at 2706  (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The opinion does not resolve and indeed does 
not even mention what had been the central question in this litigation: whether, under the 
Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for 
more than mere rationality.”). 
 68. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But the Court certainly does not apply anything 
that resembles that deferential framework.”) (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 
(1993)).  However, the Court may be applying rational basis with bite scrutiny.  See 
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Regardless of the level of scrutiny that Windsor is inferred to be employing, 
Lawrence and Windsor raise the distinct possibility that the Court when 
striking down state same-sex marriage bans will neither state what standard 
of review is being employed nor even whether the guarantees violated are 
due process, equal protection, or both.  
The difficulty posed by the Court’s failure to articulate the level of 
review is not that the determination of the constitutionality of the state 
marriage bans depends upon whether, for example, heightened scrutiny or a 
less deferential rational basis is used, because it is assumed for purposes of 
this article that such bans will be struck down.
69
 But there are other family 
issues associated with marital status, and whether states will be permitted to 
make certain legal distinctions may well depend upon the analysis used to 
strike down state same-sex marriage bans.   
C. Targeting Orientation  
The Court could strike down state same-sex marriage bans as a 
violation of due process or equal protection guarantees. Further, whether 
basing the decision on due process or equal protection, the Court might 
strike down such laws using some sort of rational basis review or, instead, 
some higher level of scrutiny. The difficulty that both legislators and courts 
will likely face is that the Court’s (probable) refusal to spell out the level of 
scrutiny employed and the Court’s (probable) discussion of both equal 
protection and due process issues will almost guarantee great confusion 
with respect to the breadth or depth of the protections thereby accorded.  
Suppose that the Court were to hold that the fundamental right to 
marry
70
 includes the right to marry a same-sex partner.
71
 That would be 
                                                                                                     
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“[S]ome objectives, such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group,’ are not legitimate state interests.  When a law exhibits such a desire …, we have 
applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the 
Equal Protection Clause.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 69. If indeed the Windsor Court is employing heightened rational basis review to 
strike down section 3 of DOMA, then it may well be that the same level of rational basis 
review would result in the Court’s striking down state same-sex marriage bans.  The Court 
suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees are at least as robust as 
those contained in the Fifth Amendment.  See U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2695 (2013). 
 70. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 83 (1987) (discussing “the fundamental right to 
marry”).   
 71. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
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important because state same-sex marriage bans would be subjected to strict 
scrutiny.
72
 But it would be important for purposes here for a very different 
reason, namely, that statutes targeting other interests that did not trigger 
strict scrutiny might not be so readily invalidated.  
Consider adoption rights. Neither the right to adopt nor the right to be 
adopted has been viewed as a fundamental interest triggering strict 
scrutiny.
73
 That a statute targeting a fundamental right had been struck 
down would not suggest that a statute targeting a mere liberty interest 
would also be constitutionally infirm. That said, a statute’s constitutionality 
will not be upheld if there is no legitimate basis for the statute.
74
 If the 
Court were to find, for example, that a statute limiting or burdening the 
adoption rights of same-sex married couples was designed “to identify a 
subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal,”
75
 the Court 
might well strike down such a statute because in effect it created “a second-
tier marriage.”
76
 For this very reason, a state distinguishing among marital 
couples by restricting stepparent adoptions to different-sex spouses of 
individuals with children would presumably trigger Windsor’s preclusion of 
differentiating among marital couples within a state. 
III. Non-Marital Rights 
The analysis of the envisioned decision would presumably protect the 
rights of same-sex married couples, but a separate issue would involve the 
degree to which such a decision would impact the rights of non-marital 
cohabitants. States might react in very different ways were the Court to 
hold that the Federal Constitution protects the right to marry a same-sex 
partner. Some states would likely (continue to) expand the rights of non-
                                                                                                     
(suggesting that the fundamental right to marry includes the right to marry a same-sex 
partner). 
 72. Id. (“Because plaintiffs seek to exercise their fundamental right to marry, their 
claim is subject to strict scrutiny.”) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978)). 
 73. See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 812 
(11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is no fundamental right to adopt or to be adopted”). 
 74. See Florida Dep’t. of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 
91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“[H]omosexual persons are allowed to serve as foster parents 
or guardians but are barred from being considered for adoptive parents …even where, as 
here, the [would-be] adoptive parent is a fit parent and the adoption is in the best interest of 
the children . . . . [T] here is no rational basis for the statute.”). 
 75. U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013). 
 76. Id.  
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marital couples, while others might not only refuse to expand those rights 
but might instead contract them.   
A. Cohabitant Rights 
Some states impose rights and obligations on members of cohabiting 
couples, whereas other states reserve marriage-like benefits for marital 
couples. A variety of state interests are implicated in such decisions. On the 
one hand, states may believe that restricting such benefits will increase the 
number of individuals who marry or remain married.
77
 On the other, states 
may recognize that growing numbers of individuals are cohabiting,
78
 and 
may believe as a matter of public policy that the longevity and stability of 




Some states already protect cohabiting relationships and provide for a 
“marital-like property distribution following a cohabitative relationship.”
80
 
While an important factor in such distributions involves the parties’ intent,
81
 
it is not necessary for the parties to have specified with particularity their 
intentions in writing. “[W]hen the parties have demonstrated through their 
actions that they intend to share their property in a marriage-like 
relationship, a court does not need to find specific intent by each cohabitant 
as to each piece of property.”
82
 
Other states permit cohabiting individuals to “lawfully contract 
concerning property, financial, and other matters relevant to their 
                                                                                                     
 77. See, e.g., State v. Schmidt, 323 P.3d 647, 664 (Alaska 2014) (“[W]e can assume 
that providing benefits to spouses promotes marriage among adults who can marry.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Courtney Thomas-Dusing, Note, The Marriage Alternative: Civil 
Unions, Domestic Partnerships, or Designated Beneficiary Agreements, 17 J. Gender Race 
& Just. 163, 163–64 (2014) (noting that “cohabitation [is] increasing in popularity”); see 
also Diana Adams, Equality for Unmarried America: Expanding Legal Choice for America's 
Diverse Families, 4 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 231, 232 –233 (2013) (“Living with a partner 
without marriage has also become common in both different-sex and same-sex couples.”). 
 79. See Adams, supra note 78, at 248 (“All Americans would benefit from having a … 
domestic partnership plan that could allow two people to share a household, share health 
insurance, and acknowledge their status as family without welcoming the government into 
their division of finances and the question of whether they are in a romantic relationship.”).  
 80. Boulds v. Nielsen, 323 P.3d 58, 62–63 (Alaska 2014).  
 81. Id. at 63 (stating that “[t]he first step in dividing an unmarried couple's property is 
to examine the couple's intent”). 
 82. Id. at 64. 
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relationship.”
83
 Such agreements are enforceable as long as they do not 
violate public policy, as they would if “sexual services [were to] constitute 
the only, or dominant, consideration for the agreement.”
84
 Some states 
impose additional limitations on cohabitation contracts, for example, New 
Jersey requires not only that such agreements be in writing but that the 
parties have had advice of counsel.
85
 
Will states be more willing to enforce cohabitation agreements or, 
perhaps, impose marriage-like rights and obligations on cohabiting 
couples?  Perhaps. Legislatures may decide to impose such obligations if 
sufficient need is established, especially if state courts have announced that 
they will not impose such obligations but will instead defer to the 
legislature.
86
  However, other legislatures may decide that awarding 
benefits to non-marital couples might undermine the special nature of 




A different but related issue involves whether the state or private 
employers will afford benefits to individuals living in non-marital 
relationships. At least some employers have offered benefits to non-marital 
couples, at least in part, because same-sex couples did not have access to 
marriage benefits.
88
 Both public and private employers may feel less of a 
need to provide those benefits for non-marital partners if indeed marriage 
equality is recognized within the state.
89
 While some commentators suggest 
                                                                                                     
 83. Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998). 
 84. Id. at 146. 
 85. See Maeker v. Ross, 62 A.3d 310, 316 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2013)  
(“[E]nforcement of palimony agreements may only occur in those instances where the 
agreement has been reduced to writing and the parties have each had the benefit of 
independent counsel.”). 
 86. See Davis v. Davis, 643 So.2d 931, 934–35 (Miss. 1994) (“We are of the opinion 
that public policy questions of such magnitude are best left to the legislative process, which 
is better equipped to resolve the questions which inevitably will arise as unmarried 
cohabitation becomes an established feature of our society.”). 
 87. Cf. Adams, supra note 78, at 241 (“As marriage is laden with public policy 
incentives to get citizens married, such as health insurance and immigration status, couples 
sometimes get married for practical reasons other than a desire to create a commitment to 
lifelong romance.”). 
 88. See Nancy D. Polikoff, What Marriage Equality Arguments Portend for Domestic 
Partner Employee Benefits, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 49, 52 (2013) (“Employee 
benefits limited to same-sex partners . . . were framed as an equity issue for same-sex 
couples who could not marry.”). 
 89. See Armin U. Kuder & Marcia Kuntz, Understanding the Legal Issues 
Surrounding Same-Sex Marriage Leading Lawyers on Adapting to Recent Supreme Court 
Decisions Impacting Family Law: Legal Challenges of Divorce for Same-Sex Couples, 
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that the revocation of such benefits would occur because of the employers’ 
belief that such benefits would not be desired,
90
 it seems at least as likely 
that some employers would suggest that although they recognize that some 
individuals would still like to have domestic partnership (rather than 
marital) benefits, the unfairness concerns
91
 implicated by same-sex 
marriage bans are not present when same-sex couples are permitted to 
marry.  
Many same-sex and different-sex couples would prefer not to marry 
and would nonetheless like to receive those benefits, and it may be thought 
unjust to require couples to marry in order to receive such benefits.
92
 
However, at least as a matter of federal constitutional mandate, it seems 
unlikely that the Court would hold that public employers must accord the 
same benefits to marital and non-marital couples.
93
 Further, state 
constitutional law may prohibit according marital benefits to non-marital 
couples,
94
 and there may be insufficient popular support to amend the state 
constitution to permit or require treating marital and non-marital couples 
equally, especially if same-sex marriage is not at issue. That said, if trends 
continue and it remains true that “fewer people are marrying,”95 then 
perhaps there will be sufficient support to amend a state constitution to 
permit or require equal benefits for marital and non-marital couples. 
B. Parenting Rights 
                                                                                                     
ASPATORE, 2013 WL 4391623, *4 n.49 (2013) (“A consequence … of the … rapid growth in 
the number of states permitting same-sex marriage is that employers that previously offered 
benefits to same-sex domestic partners…might reexamine those policies and require 
couples . . . [to] get married . . . in order to continue receiving employer-provided benefits.”). 
 90. See Adams, supra note 78, at 246 (“Unfortunately, when same-sex marriage 
passes in a state, domestic partnership and civil union options are sometimes lost . . . . This 
is a dramatic presumption that these citizens would prefer marriage.”). 
 91. Cf. Carlin Meyer, Who Cares?: Reflections on Law, Loss, and Family Values in 
the Wake of 9/11, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 653, 658 (2002–2003) (discussing “the unfairness 
of excluding domestic partners”). 
 92. See generally Polikoff, supra note 88. 
 93. Cf. supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (noting that the Court seems to 
distinguish between marital and non-marital relationships for constitutional purposes). 
 94. See Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich.,748 N.W.2d 524, 538 (Mich. 
2008) (“[I]f there were any residual doubt regarding whether the marriage amendment 
prohibits the recognition of a domestic partnership for the purpose at issue here, this 
language makes it clear that such a recognition is indeed prohibited ‘for any purpose,’ which 
obviously includes for the purpose of providing health-insurance benefits.”). 
 95. Amy L. Wax, The Family Law Doctrine of Equivalence, 107 MICH. L. REV. 999, 
1017 (2009). 
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If same-sex marriage were recognized as federally protected, then 
certain parenting rights would also presumably be recognized, for example, 
the presumption of parentage that arises when a child is born into a marital 
relationship.
96
 A separate question, however, is whether states will be more 
expansive with respect to the parental rights of unmarried adults who have 
adopted parental roles. 
First, it should be noted that several states recognize functional 
parents,
97
 i.e., adults who are accorded some sort of parental status, lack of 
adoptive or biological tie to the child notwithstanding.
98
 The focus here is 
on the recognition of non-marital functional parents rather than, for 
example, functional parents who are stepparents.
99
 
Recognizing functional parents can have a variety of benefits.
100
 
Precisely because individuals take on functional parenting roles in a variety 
of contexts, the recognition of same-sex marriage will not end the need for 
or the usefulness of recognizing functional parents.
101
 Nonetheless, the 
recognition of same-sex marriage may have a role in whether or the degree 
to which courts will recognize functional parentage, as the following series 
of Vermont cases helps illustrate.   
                                                                                                     
 96. See Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 861 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) 
(“The pervasive and powerful common law presumptions that link both spouses in a 
marriage to a child born of the marriage-the presumption of legitimacy within a marriage 
and the presumption of a spouse's consent to artificial insemination-apply to this [same-sex] 
couple.”). 
 97. See Joanna L. Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status 
for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 671, 677 (2012) (“In 
some states, courts or the legislature have recognized either full parental or quasi-parental 
status based on a functional parent-child relationship.”). 
 98. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form: 
Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 
422 –23 (2013) (“Functional parents are people who function in parental roles without 
having any formal legal status as parents.”). 
 99. See id. at 424 (noting that functional parents might be cohabiting with or married 
to the biological or adoptive parent). 
 100. See id. at 438 (“[T]here are three bases given for justifying the need for functional 
parenthood: (1) for the benefit of children; (2) for the benefit of formal parents; and (3) for 
the benefit of functional caregivers”). 
 101. See Jason D. Hans & Martie Gillen, Social Security Survivors Benefits: The Effects 
of Reproductive Pathways and Intestacy Law on Attitudes, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 514, 
515 (2013) (“This functional parenthood approach . . . allows legal parentage to be awarded 
based on the role an adult takes in a child's life . . . . [N]on-traditional parents, such as 
stepparents and same-sex partners of genetic parents, can gain legal recognition in the 
absence of biological ties or legal adoption.”). 
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C. Vermont on Functional Parentage 
Vermont was one of the first states to recognize second parent 
adoption,
102
 which permits a parent’s non-marital partner to adopt his or her 
child,
103
 assuming that no one else has parental rights with respect to that 
child.
104
 That way, each member of a same-sex couple raising a child could 





 involved a custody dispute “between two 
women who had both participated in raising a child adopted by only one of 
them.”
107
 At issue was whether Chris Titchenal would be recognized as a 
functional parent, where “[f]or the first three and one-half years of [the 
child]Sarah's  life, … [Chris] cared for the child approximately 65% of the 
time.”
108
 Chris had never adopted Sarah because she had mistakenly 
believed that she was precluded by law from doing so.
109
 The Vermont 
Supreme Court suggested that it did not have the power to grant Titchenal a 
remedy,
110
 noting that “[e]quity generally has no jurisdiction over imperfect 
                                                                                                     
 102. See Grossman, supra note 97, at 675. 
 103. See Jennifer Sroka, Note, A Mother Yesterday, But Not Today: Deficiencies of the 
Uniform Parentage Act for Non-Biological Parents in Same-Sex Relationships,  47 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 537, 538 n.5 (2013) (“The process of second parent adoption allows a non-biological 
parent to become a legal parent through adoption, while the natural or first adoptive parent 
retains legal parental status.”) (quoting DENIS CLIFFORD, FREDERICK HERTZ & EMILY 
DOSKOW, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 84 (Emily Doskow ed., 15th ed. 
2010)).  
 104. See J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Breaking the Mold and Picking up the 
Pieces: Rights of Parenthood and Parentage in Nontraditional Families, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 
104, 111 (2013) (“Even in states permitting second-parent adoption, consent of the 
noncustodial biological parent is required.”). 
 105. See In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (allowing same-sex 
partner of parent to adopt that parent’s child). 
 106. 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997). 
 107. Id. at 683. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 686–87. 
[P]laintiff contends that she did not attempt to adopt Sarah at the time defendant 
did because the parties believed that Vermont's then-current adoption laws 
would not permit it.  ‘A person or husband and wife together . . . may adopt any 
other person’”) (citing 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 431 (repealed 1996). The language 
of the statute, however, certainly did not preclude plaintiff from seeking to adopt 
Sarah; indeed, as of December 1991, when Sarah was only five months old, at 
least one Vermont probate court had allowed the female partner of a child's 
adoptive mother to adopt the child as a second parent.  
 110. Id. at 684 (“We find no legal basis for plaintiff's proposal. Courts cannot exert 
equitable powers unless they first have jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.”) 
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rights arising from moral rather than legal obligations; not every perceived 
injustice is actionable in equity—only those violating a recognized legal 
right.”
111
  While recognizing that “there are public-policy considerations 
that favor allowing third parties claiming a parent-like relationship to seek 
court-compelled parent-child contact,”
112
 the court explained that “these 
considerations are not so clear and compelling that they require us to 
acknowledge that de facto parents have a legally cognizable right to parent-
child contact, thereby allowing the superior court to employ its equitable 
powers to adjudicate their claims.”
113
 The court concluded that “absent 
statutory authority extending the family court's jurisdiction to adjudicate 
third-party visitation requests,
114
 … legal parents retain the right to 




The Vermont functional parent jurisprudence may have changed in 
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins
116
 in which a biological parent challenged 
the parentage of her former civil union partner.
117
 Lisa and Janet entered 
into a civil union in December, 2000,
118
 while they were still living in 
Virginia.
119
 Lisa was artificially inseminated with sperm provided by an 
anonymous donor, resulting in the birth of IMJ.
120
 When IMJ was about 
four months old, the family moved to Vermont.
121
 A little less than a year 
later, Lisa and Janet separated.
122
 Lisa moved back to Virginia but filed in a 
Vermont court to end their civil union.
123
 The court granted Lisa temporary 
physical and legal custody but also granted Janet parent-child contact.
124
 
                                                                                                     
(citing In re Marriage of Ryall, 201 Cal. Rptr. 504, 512 (Cal. App. 1984)). 
 111. Id. at 684 (citing In re E.C., 387 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Wis. 1986)). 
 112. Id. at 689. 
 113. Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 689 (Vt. 1997). 
 114. Id. at 690 (citing OR.REV STAT. § 109.119(1)(1989)).  
 115. Id. (citing Finck v. O’Toole, 880 P.2d 624, 627 (Ariz. 1994)). 
 116. 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006). 
 117. See id. at 955 (“Lisa Miller–Jenkins appeals a family court decision finding her 
ex[-]partner, Janet Miller–Jenkins, to be a parent of their three-year-old child conceived 
via artificial insemination.”). 
 118. Id. at 956.  
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 956 (Vt. 2006) (“After the 
separation, in September 2003, Lisa moved to Virginia with IMJ. . . . On November 24, 
2003, Lisa filed a petition to dissolve the civil union in the Vermont family court in 
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Although Lisa permitted Janet and IMJ to have parent-child contact at 
first, she later refused to do so.
125
 In addition, Lisa filed in Virginia to 
establish IMJ’s parentage.
126
 The Virginia and Vermont courts were in 
contact with each other,
127
 although they were unable to reach a resolution 
and each court claimed to have jurisdiction to decide the matters before 
it.
128
  Ultimately, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act and the Vermont version of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act established that Vermont rather than Virginia had 
jurisdiction over the case,
129
 and the Virginia Supreme Court held that Lisa 
was bound by the first Virginia appellate court ruling deferring to the 




For purposes here, the Miller-Jenkins Vermont Supreme Court 
decision is relevant because of how it treated parentage. First, the court 
noted that Janet was a presumptive parent by virtue of her having been 
Lisa’s civil union partner.
131
 Yet, Janet’s presumptive parentage by virtue of 
her civil union status might have been problematic in this case. At the time, 
                                                                                                     
Rutland.”). 
 124. See id. at 955. 
 125. Id. (“Although Lisa permitted the first court ordered parent-child-contact weekend, 
she did not allow Janet to have parent-child contact after that date, nor did she allow Janet to 
have telephone contact with IMJ, as the family court had ordered.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. at 957 (“[T]he Vermont and Virginia courts consulted by telephone . . . .”). 
 128. See id. at 956–57 (Vt. 2006).(“[O]n July 19, 2004, the Vermont court reaffirmed 
its ‘jurisdiction over this case including all parent-child contact issues,’ stated that it would 
not ‘defer to a different State that would preclude the parties from a remedy,’ and made clear 
that the temporary order for parent-child contact was to be followed.”). But see id. at 957 
(“On September 9, the Virginia court held it had jurisdiction to determine the parentage and 
parental rights of IMJ and that any claims of Janet to parental status were ‘based on rights 
under Vermont's civil union laws that are null and void under VA. CODE § 20–45.3.’”). 
 129. See id. at 959. 
 130. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822, 825 (Va. 2008) (“The Court 
of Appeals further held in the first Virginia appeal that Vermont law governed the parties’ 
dispute, and that the courts of Virginia were bound by Vermont’s interpretation of its own 
law.”); id. at 827 (“[T]he Court of Appeals’ holding in the first Virginia appeal is binding 
under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine.”).  
 131. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 967 (Vt. 2006) (“If we were 
to . . . conclude biology controlled, a child born from artificial insemination would have no 
second parent…unless the putative second parent adopted the child. . . . [S]uch a holding 
would be wrong.”). See id. at 970 (“Many factors are present here that support a conclusion 
that Janet is a parent, including, first and foremost, that Janet and Lisa were in a valid legal 
union at the time of the child’s birth.”). 
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Virginia refused to recognize any rights arising from a civil union,
132
 which 
presumably would have precluded the state from recognizing any 
presumptive rights arising from such a relationship. Yet, that might mean 
that if Janet were a parent by virtue of factors having nothing to do with a 




Whether or not the Vermont Supreme Court was motivated by such 
reasoning to provide a different rationale upon which Janet’s parental status 
might be based, the court explained why Janet qualified as a functional 
parent.  
It was the expectation and intent of both Lisa and Janet that Janet would 
be IMJ's parent. Janet participated in the decision that Lisa would be 
artificially inseminated to bear a child and participated actively in the 
prenatal care and birth. Both Lisa and Janet treated Janet as IMJ's parent 
during the time they resided together, and Lisa identified Janet as a 
parent of IMJ in the dissolution petition. Finally, there is no other 
claimant to the status of parent, and, as a result, a negative decision 
would leave IMJ with only one parent.
134
 
The Miller-Jenkins court expressly declined to address which factors 
were necessary or sufficient for a finding that someone was a functional 
parent,
135
 leaving that issue for another day. Nonetheless, the Vermont court 
at least seemed to recognize a status that it was unwilling to recognize in 
Titchenal. Was the court recognizing this additional basis for Janet’s status 
as a parent because there would then be less reason for Virginia to refuse to 
recognize her parentage? That is unclear, especially because Virginia did 
and does not recognize de facto parents.
136
 Nonetheless, a refusal to 
                                                                                                     
 132. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3, invalidated by Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 
456 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“Any … civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement entered 
into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in 
Virginia and any contractual rights created thereby shall be void and unenforceable.”). 
 133. See Mark P. Strasser, DOMA and the Constitution, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 1011, 
1016 (2010) (“A parental relationship established in another way, e.g., because one of the 
individuals is a legal parent by virtue of being a functional parent, does not trigger DOMA 
and is not subject to the same arguments for non-recognition.”). 
 134. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 970. 
 135. Id. at 971 (“Because so many factors are present in this case that allow us to hold 
that the non-biologically-related partner is the child's parent, we need not address which 
factors may be dispositive on the issue in a closer case.”). 
 136. See Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 498–99 (Va. App. 2008) (“We note that no 
appellate court in Virginia has ever so applied the de facto parent doctrine, despite numerous 
opportunities under analogous circumstances to do so. We likewise decline to do so now.”) 
(citing Surles v. Mayer, 628 S.E.2d 563 (Va. App. 2006)); see also Rachel E. Shoaf, Note, 
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recognize functional parent status under Virginia law might not be 
dispositive in a case in which the question was whether to recognize a de 
facto status granted in a different jurisdiction.
137
 
The Vermont Supreme Court recently addressed functional parent 
status in Moreau v. Sylvester
138
 in which the court addressed the parental 
status of a former partner of a mother with children.
139
  Christopher Moreau 
had “played a significant, father-figure role in both of the children's lives,
 
140
 He and Noel Sylvester had “an on-again-off-again relationship for eight 
to ten years, [although] they never married.”
141
  
There was an existing “relief-from-abuse (RFA) order denying him 
visitation with the children.”
142
 Moreau had had custody of the children 
when Sylvester’s residence had been rendered uninhabitable due to 
flooding,
143
 and she had testified that on at least one occasion during the 
period his refusal to return the children to her had “created a dangerous 
situation.”
144
 Sylvester was aware that Moreau owned a gun,
145
 and he 
would sometimes arrive at her house uninvited after he had first made sure 
that the person with whom Sylvester was currently living was still at 
work.
146
 To make matters even more frightening, Sylvester had testified that 
Moreau had sent her “a text message stating ‘I promise you, for the rest of 
my life, I will find my girls and I will never stop, ever.’”
147
 
The Moreau court discussed Vermont functional parent jurisprudence, 
noting that the Titchenal court had found “no legal basis”
 148
 for “claims 
                                                                                                     
Two Mothers and Their Child: A Look at the Uncertain Status of Non-biological Lesbian 
Mothers Under Contemporary Law, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 267, 294 (2005) 
(“While Virginia strictly adheres to a ‘traditional’ one mother and one father model, based 
on a biological link, other states recognize the potential for functional parenthood to better 
serve the needs of the parties seeking recognition of a parent-child relationship.”). 
 137. See Debra H. v. Janice R.,14 N.Y.3d 576, 601 (N.Y. 2010) (“New York will 
recognize parentage created by a civil union in Vermont.”).  
 138. 95 A.3d 416 (Vt. 2014). 
 139. See id. at 422 (“Defendant contends that he is the children's de facto parent and 
entitled to assert and be heard on custody, parentage and visitation rights.”). 
 140. See id. at 417. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 417–418 (Vt. 2014). 
 144. Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A.3d 416, 417–418 (Vt. 2014). 
 145. Id. at 418. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 420. 
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brought by putative de facto parents.”
149
 The Vermont court then addressed 
its Miller-Jenkins reasoning, distinguishing the cases because “there is no 
civil union, or any other legally recognized domestic relationship between 
the parties [in Moreau] as [there had been] in Miller–Jenkins.”
150
 After 
noting that “the children in this case are not the product of mutually-agreed-
upon artificial insemination,”
151
 the court summed up its position by 
suggesting that “the parental rights recognized in Miller–Jenkins were 
based upon statutory rights of civil union partners, not on any general 
judicial endorsement of de facto parenthood.”
152
 The court denied that its 
decision in Moreau foreclosed the possibility of de facto parentage 
recognition in a case in which “two persons agree to conceive a child 
through artificial insemination,”
153
 although the Miller-Jenkins court had 
never implied that the agreement to conceive through artificial insemination 
was key to a finding of functional parenthood.
154
  
In dissent, Justice Robinson noted that the Miller-Jenkins court had 
“identified a host of factors other than biology and a legal relationship with 
an acknowledged parent as relevant to the question of who is a 
parent.”
155
 Justice Robinson worried that Moreau seemed to stand for the 
proposition that “if faced with facts identical to those presented in Miller–
Jenkins, except with parents who were not joined in a legally recognized 
status at the time the child was conceived, this Court could deny the 
nonbiological mother's claim out of hand.”
156
 
The characterization of Moreau offered by the majority was rather 
unsympathetic, although Justice Robinson offered a much different view. 
[The] putative father has alleged that both children call him “daddy or 
papa,” that he was in the delivery room when M.S. was born and was 
one of the first people to hold her; he has been involved in L.M.'s life 
since she was six months old and M.S.'s since birth—participating in 
their respective first steps, first words, and other developmental 
                                                                                                     
 149. Id. 
 150. Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A.3d 416, 422 (Vt. 2014). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 423 n.10.  
 154. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 971 (Vt. 2006). (“Because so 
many factors are present in this case that allow us to hold that the nonbiologically-related 
partner is the child's parent, we need not address which factors may be dispositive on the 
issue in a closer case.”) 
 155. Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A.3d at 435 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. 
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milestones; even before moving in with the children's mother, he visited 
L.M. and M.S. almost every day during the first six months of M.S.'s 
life; he lived with mother and the children from the time M.S. was about 
six months old, in August 2006, through March 2009; he changed 
diapers, tended to them when they cried in the middle of the night, and 
did all the things a good father does when needed by his or her child; he 
was involved with M.S.'s preschool programming; he went to all school 
and ballet performances in which either child was involved; he provided 
all the basic necessities for the children such as food, shelter and 
clothing, and also paid for ballet lessons and school 
supplies; after mother and the children moved out in March 2009 until 
April 2011, he spent about 600 days of the next 730 days with the 
children; in April 2011, their mother voluntarily left them to live with 
him at least six days a week for nearly a year until March 2012; mother 
frequently cancelled or no-showed for her regular scheduled visits with 
the children during that time period; and mother abruptly removed the 
children from the schools they were attending while living with putative 
father with only three months remaining in the term.
157
 
Needless to say, the two characterizations of Moreau are very different 
and might yield very different determinations with respect to whether the 
children would be benefited or, instead, harmed by his having visitation 
rights.
158
 Such a determination did not have to be made because Moreau’s 
parental status was not recognized, although Justice Robinson pointed out 
some of the possible detrimental effects of a refusal to recognize functional 
parent status in her appeal to the Vermont Legislature to recognize that 
status.  
[T]he Legislature has the power to pass laws to ensure that other 
children in L.M. and M.S.'s circumstances are not denied the continuing 
financial, emotional, and developmental support of one of their actual 
parents because their biological parent has ‘pulled rank’ and denied the 
other's parental status after promoting and cultivating that parent's 
relationship with the child for most or all of the children's lives.
159
 
It is not clear what to make of Moreau. Perhaps unsympathetic facts 
drove the decision, including the potential for domestic violence.
160
 
However, it might be noted that domestic violence did not preclude 
recognition of functional parent status in the California case In re Nicholas 
                                                                                                     
 157. Id. at 446 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 158. See id. (“If the majority's analysis were to stand, the consequences for some 
children, potentially including L.M. and M.S., would be nothing short of tragic.”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See supra notes 141–46 and accompanying text. 
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H.,
161
 notwithstanding that both the mother
162
 and the functional father
163
 
had been violent with each other.  
Nicholas H. involved a man, Thomas, who admittedly was not the 
biological father of a boy named Nicholas,
164
 although both Thomas and the 
boy’s mother, Kimberly, wanted Thomas “to act as a father to Nicholas.”
165
 
Thomas “provided a home for Kimberly and Nicholas for several years.”
166
 
Further, Thomas had a strong bond with the boy, while the boy’s biological 
father had played no role in Nicholas’s life.
167
 
The juvenile court found that Thomas’s presumptive parenthood of 
Nicholas had not been rebutted.
168
 The California Supreme Court affirmed, 
confident that permitting Thomas to have parental status would greatly 
benefit Nicholas both because of the strong bond between the two and 
because the child would otherwise be homeless.
169
 
Nicholas H. and Moreau are distinguishable in that there was no 
suggestion in the Moreau majority opinion that the children would face dire 
consequences were Moreau’s parentage not recognized,
170
 although the 
dissent suggested that the children might indeed thereby be harmed.
171
 An 
additional consideration that might have been telling was that Moreau never 
adopted the children, even though Vermont law had permitted such an 
                                                                                                     
 161. 28 Cal. 4th 56 (Cal. 2002). 
 162. Id. at 59 (“Most recently, the two fought over Nicholas during a holiday visit in 
December 1999 at the home of Thomas's mother, Carol, who lives in Lakewood, California. 
Kimberly attacked and bit Thomas. The police were called and Kimberly was arrested for 
felony assault.”). 
 163. See id. at 60 (“Kimberly gave police a copy of a Los Angeles County protective 
order dated September 3, 1998, restraining Thomas from having contact with Kimberly or 
Nicholas until March 2, 2001.”). 
 164. Id. at 61. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.  
 167. See In re Nicholas H., 28 Cal. 4th 56, 58 (Cal. 2002) (“While his presumed father 
is providing a loving home for him, his mother has not done so, and his biological father, 
whose identity has never been judicially determined, has shown no interest in doing so.”). 
 168. See id. at 61. 
 169. See id. (discussing the strong bond between them); see also id. at 59 (“[T]his child 
will be rendered fatherless and homeless.”). 
 170. See Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A.3d 416, 437 (Vt. 2014) (suggesting that there were 
no dire circumstances at issue that might justify placing children with a non-parent). 
 171. See id. at 446 (Robinson, J., dissenting) (“If the majority’s analysis were to stand, 
the consequences for some children, potentially including L.M. and M.S., would be nothing 
short of tragic.”). 
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adoption.
172
 Indeed, the Vermont court likened what was at issue in Moreau 
to what had been at issue in Titchenal, reasoning that “[p]artners of 
heterosexual or same-sex couples could ‘protect their interests’ in potential 
parentage through existing procedures.”
173
  
One of the confusing aspects of the Vermont jurisprudence is that one 
cannot tell whether it is Miller-Johnson rather than Moreau that is an outlier 
or whether, instead, the cases are quite compatible.
174
 Further, one cannot 
tell whether Miller-Johnson was recognizing functional parent status for a 
limited time only
175
—one would not expect a court to announce that it was 
adopting a temporary, alternative basis for parenthood to circumvent a 
different state’s refusal to recognize parental status, even were that an 
accurate depiction of what was happening. That said, the mere possibility 
that the Miller-Johnson court was doing this does not establish that the 
court in fact was temporarily offering another basis for parentage to help 
protect a Vermont citizen’s parental rights. 
Interestingly, a California court might have adopted a strategy 
analogous to the (possible) strategy employed in Miller-Johnson to protect 
a California citizen’s parental rights, although that court never stated that it 
was doing so. Consider Charisma R. v. Kristina S.,
176
 which involved a 
same-sex couple who entered into a California domestic partnership
177
 
before having a child.
178
 The couple broke up a few months after the child’s 
birth,
179
 and the issue before the intermediate appellate court was whether 
                                                                                                     
 172. See id. at 425 (majority opinion) (“Heterosexual couples could then and now, as 
same-sex couples can now, achieve parentage rights through marriage or adoption.”). 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. at 422 (“But the differences between Miller–Jenkins and the present case 
far exceed their singular similarity of a now-estranged partner who shared child rearing with 
the biological mother.”). 
 175. Cf. Richard Aborn & Marlene Koury, Toward a Future, Wiser Court: A Blueprint 
for Overturning District of Columbia v. Heller, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1353, 1376 (2012) 
(“Bush v. Gore . . . fashioned a unique, one-time-only reading of the Equal Protection Clause 
to resolve a case of bottomless political import.”). 
 176. 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26 (Cal. App. 2009). 
 177. See id. at 31–32 (“Charisma R. (Charisma) and Kristina S. (Kristina) were a same 
sex couple who began dating in July 1997, moved in together in August 1998, and registered 
as domestic partners with the State of California in January 2002.”). 
 178. See id. at 32 (“Kristina became pregnant by artificial insemination and gave birth 
to Amalia in April 2003.”). 
 179. See id. (“In July 2003, Kristina moved out of the home she shared with Charisma, 
taking Amalia with her.”). 
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It might seem surprising that the Charisma R. court decided the case 
entirely on presumed parent status and did not base the parentage decision 










 on the civil union status of the parties.  Kristina 
having been living in Texas at the time of the decision
185
 might have played 
some role in the framing of the opinion. Texas refuses to give effect to 
rights arising out of civil unions,
186
 and the Charisma R. court might have 
feared that parentage based on a domestic partnership status would be less 
likely to be enforced in Texas.
187
 Both Charisma R. and Miller-Johnson 
emphasized functional parentage where doing so seemed less likely to 
provoke a non-recognition response in a sister state. 
                                                                                                     
 180. See id. at 34 (“Charisma bore the burden of proving she is a presumed parent 
under section 7611(d) by a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also id. at 45 (“The trial 
court’s decision is well-supported by the evidence.”). 
 181. Cf. In re J.N., No. B235505, 2012 WL 2019891, at *1 (Cal. App. 2012) (“Rachel 
N. is the biological mother of J.N., who was conceived with a sperm donor and was born in 
2004. Rachel N. was in a registered domestic partnership with Kris F. at the time, and Kris 
F. is therefore considered J.N.'s other parent.”) (citing CAL. FAM. CODE, §§ 
297, 297.5(d); Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 4th 108, 119 (2005)). 
 182. See Charisma R., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 31–32. 
 183. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 967 (Vt. 2006) (“We find that 
Janet has status as a parent, even beyond her stepparent status . . . .”). 
 184. See Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A.3d 416, 422 (Vt. 2014) (“[T]he parental rights 
recognized in Miller–Jenkins were based upon statutory rights of civil union partners, not on 
any general judicial endorsement of de facto parenthood . . . .”). 
 185. See Charisma R., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52. 
 186. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204(c), invalidated by De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. 
Supp. 2d 632 (W. Tex. 2014) (“The state . . . not give effect to a:  (1) public act . . . that 
creates . . . a marriage between persons of the same sex . . . or (2) . . . claim to any legal 
protection . . . asserted as a result of a marriage between persons of the same sex . . . in this 
state or in any other jurisdiction.”). 
 187. Cf. Suzanne B. Goldberg et al., Family Law Scholarship Goes to Court:  
Functional Parenthood and the Case of Debra H. v. Janice R., 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
348, 356 n.25 (2011) (“Charisma R. did not address the manner in which an out-of-state 
civil union factors into recognizing parental rights.”); see also Rena M. Lindevaldsen, Same-
Sex Relationships and the Full Faith and Credit Clause:  Reducing America to the Lowest 
Common Denominator, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 29, 35–36 (2009) (“Kristina, a 
Texas resident since summer 2005, faces the question of whether Texas courts, despite a 
state defense of marriage act and constitutional amendment, will permit Charisma to register 
and enforce the California custody order in the state of Texas.”). 
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The claim here is not that the functional parent status was recognized 
in Charisma R. as a way to circumvent non-recognition, because California 
had already recognized that status in in the context of same-sex parenting 
prior to the case.
188
 Further, Charisma and Kristina had planned to have a 
child together and then did, which supported a finding of functional parent 
status.
189
 The only potential difficulty for such a finding in this case 
involved the amount of time that Charisma had parented Amalia before the 
couple had broken up, although the intermediate appellate court did not find 
that an insuperable difficulty.
190
 
Did the Charisma R. court refuse to address the parental presumption 
arising from the domestic partnership precisely because it did not want to 
raise an issue that might jeopardize recognition of Charisma’s parenting 
rights in another jurisdiction? That is unclear. The suggestion here is merely 
that courts might adopt particular legal approaches out of a belief that 
certain legal options have been unfairly denied to a particular group of 
people, either within the state or in other states where local parties’ rights 
might be at issue.
191
 If that is so and if states are precluded from refusing to 
recognize same-sex marriage in light of the envisioned opinion, then one 
might expect some courts to be less willing to provide equitable remedies in 
certain kinds of cases. 
IV. Conclusion 
                                                                                                     
 188. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 668 (Cal. 2005) (“We conclude that 
the present case, like Nicholas H. and Salvador M., is not ‘an appropriate action’ in which to 
rebut the presumption of presumed parenthood with proof that Elisa is not the twins’ 
biological parent.”). 
 189. See Charisma R., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 32 (“In December 2001, the couple decided 
they wanted to have children and Kristina would be the first to try to become pregnant. 
Following several months of effort, Kristina became pregnant by artificial insemination and 
gave birth to Amalia in April 2003.”). 
 190. See id. (“We reject Kristina’s contentions that Charisma did not parent Amalia for 
a sufficient period of time to be declared a presumed parent.”). 
 191. In Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542 (Kan. 2013), the Kansas Supreme Court 
upheld the enforceability of a parenting agreement. See id. at 558 (“the coparenting 
agreement in this case does not violate public policy and is not unenforceable.”). 
Enforcement was sought before the biological parent moved to Texas with the two children. 
See id. at 545 (“A few months after the couple separated, Goudschaal notified Frazier that 
she was taking the children to Texas, prompting Frazier to file this action, seeking inter 
alia to enforce the coparenting agreement.”). Perhaps the concerns raised here played a role 
in that decision as well.  
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Suppose that the United States Supreme Court were to hold that the 
Federal Constitution protects the right to marry a same-sex partner. How 
might such a ruling affect marriage and family law more generally? 
States might try to create two differing marital statuses, affording 
certain rights and obligations to one but not the other status. Were states to 
do that and were they to reserve one of the statuses for different-sex and the 
other status for same-sex couples, such a law would likely be struck down 
in light of the guarantees recognized in Windsor and in the envisioned 
opinion striking down same-sex marriage bans.  
What effects would such a decision have on the rights of non-marital 
couples? It seems likely that we will continue to have a divergence among 
the states with respect to such rights. Some as a matter of public policy will 
accord non-marital couples more rights and obligations, whereas others will 
try to preserve or possibly increase the difference between marital and non-
marital status. Further, at least in the eyes of some, there will no longer be a 
need to remedy the injustice that had been implicated in refusing to permit 
same-sex couples to marry, thereby providing less incentive to mitigate the 
differences between marital and non-marital couples.  
We have not seen monumental changes in family law in those states 
that recognize same-sex marriage whether as a matter of statute or of state 
constitutional guarantees, which undermines the plausibility of the claim 
that federal constitutional protection of the right to marry a same-sex 
partner will bring about monumental changes. While family law will 
continue to develop, federal constitutional protection of same-sex marriage 
is unlikely to bring about the changes that some commentators had hoped 
for and others had feared.
192
  
                                                                                                     
 192. Cf. Douglas Nejaime, Before Marriage:  The Unexplored History of Nonmarital 
Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 87, 97 (2014) 
(“[C]ommunities where marriage lawsuits emerged . . . understood them as 
[reflecting] radical gay politics and critiques of marriage. [Both] Baker and McConnell 
suggested . . . their lawsuit might turn marriage ‘upside down.’” ); see also Elizabeth B. 
Wydra, Reading the Opinions--and the Tea Leaves--in United States v. Windsor, 2013 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 95, 99 (2012–2013) (“In passing DOMA, the report from the House . . . 
concluded, . . . . ‘The effort to redefine marriage to extend to homosexual couples is a truly 
radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the institution of marriage.’”) (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 104-664, at 12–13 (1996)). 
